In this paper we examine ten concrete propositional update operations of the literature. We start by completely characterizing their relative strength and their computational complexity. Then we evaluate the competing update operations w.r.t. the postulates proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon. It turns out that the majority violates most of the postulates. We argue that all violated postulates are undesirable except one. After that we evaluate the update operations w.r.t. another property which has been investigated extensively in the literature, viz. that disjunctive updates should not be identi ed with the exclusive disjunction. We argue that this is desirable, and show that the argument gives further support to the rejection of two of the postulates. Finally we study how the di erent approaches accommodate general laws governing the world, alias integrity constraints. Summing up our results, we conclude that only two of the update operations are satisfactory.
Introduction
A database being a device to store and retrieve information, it has been proposed by Levesque 27 ] to view a database as being equipped with a querying function ASK and an update function TELL. ASK(light-on) is a query meaning that the database is asked whether it follows from the data contained in it that the light in question is on.
TELL(light-on) is an update meaning that light-on is a new piece of data which the database should take into account. This is a much fuzzier requirement than that for ASK. The easiest case seems to be when the input light-on is already in the database (or follows from it) and there is no need to act. 1 Things get more complex if light-on does not follow from the current database, and they get even harder if light-on contradicts it. In early database systems it had been considered that the new data should be systematically rejected in the latter case. Such a trivial TELL-function is unsatisfactory in most applications. Other approaches such as the introduction of so-called`null values' in relational databases turned out to be problematic as well (cf. the discussion in 38, section 1.1]). 2 
What changes? -updates vs. revisions
Several authors coming from the database eld such as Winslett, Katsuno, Mendelzon, Satoh and Grahne have linked the problematics of database updating to that of belief change as studied by philosophers in the eld of formal epistemology. There, what is studied are operations mapping a current belief base B and an input A to a new belief base B A. ( We shall henceforth synonymously use the terms database and belief base.)
Alchourr on, G ardenfors and Makinson had established in the eighties a set of rationality postulates that every reasonable belief revision operation should satisfy (the AGM postulates), and had proved characterization theorems.
It has been claimed that there is the following fundamental semantical di erence between update operations and AGM revision operations.
if the input does not correspond to a change in the real state of a airs then the belief base should be revised: change takes place only at the knowledge level, i.e. within the beliefs that are held about a xed real state of a airs; if the input mirrors changes in the real state of a airs then the belief base should be updated.
The di erence between these two operations has been pointed out rst in 25] , and has been taken up in 24] . In the case of an update, when the belief base is noti ed of a change occurring in the real state of a airs by a TELL-operation, the description of the possible states of a airs must be modi ed accordingly. The classical explanation as given in 18] is as follows. 1 Note nevertheless that we might want to strengthen the degree of certainty (degree of belief, acceptance, . . . ) of the piece of data light-on. 2 There is another function dual to TELL which has been discussed in the literature, that is called erasure or contraction, which retracts data from the database. We shall not treat it in this paper, one of the reasons being that it can be de ned from the TELL-function via the so-called Harper identity 16, 24] .
Since we are con ned to our set of possibilities, we must make the change come true in all of our candidate worlds. Semantically, we change each of the possible worlds`as little as possible' in order to make the new state of a airs hold. Our new syntactic description of the worlds of interest should now correctly re ect the outcome of this set of changes. The function that maps the old description to the new is called an update. Katsuno and Mendelzon have based such a notion of minimal change on orderings of closeness (or similarity) between possible worlds, in much the same way as it has been done by Lewis in conditional logics 28] . Paralleling the AGM postulates, Katsuno and Mendelzon have then characterized these models by a set of postulates that every reasonable belief update operation should satisfy (the KM postulates).
It can be shown 21, Theorem 22, p.218] that update operations are not only di erent from AGM-revision operations, but even incompatible with them (in the sense that there is no operation that satis es both the AGM and the KM postulates). Given that incompatibility, what remains is a practical problem: in a given situation, which change operation should we choose? Things are clear in the case e.g. of fault diagnosis or detective stories, where the real world usually does not evolve any more: a murder or a fault in a circuit has occurred, and the detective revises his beliefs in the light of new information about that xed picture. But in a lot of cases we ignore whether the input corresponds to an event in the real world or not.
It has been proposed e.g. in 8, 24 ] to view incoming information as timestamped: the current belief base being labelled with t, when a belief labelled t 0 comes in then we choose revision if t = t 0 , and update else. In fact this amounts to explicitly say \revise" or \update". But in everyday situations (as well as e.g. in robotics) we might hesitate over the choice of the change operation, and we cannot presuppose that incoming information is time-stamped.
What is minimal change?
The KM postulates give us the abstract properties of update operations w.r.t. the logical and metalogical operators of classical logic. One might expect that the set of postulates characterizes one single update operation: the`right' one. 3 Is this the case, i.e. is there a unique operation such that for every description of the world and input computes the correct resulting belief base? First of all, we note that if such a exists then our description of the world 3 Compare this to the case of the deduction relation for classical logic: Gentzen's rules can be viewed as describing the interplay between the deduction relationà nd the Boolean connectives, and they are su cient to characterize a unique`.
should not only contain the current belief base, but also something like a set of laws governing the world.
The answer is negative: the class of update operations admitted by the KMpostulates is not a singleton. (Worse, it contains the trivial update operation which retains the input (and destroys the belief base) when it does not follow from the belief base.) Semantically, this corresponds to the fact that there is more than one ordering of closeness between possible worlds. In the case of conditionals, Lewis 28, has stressed that this had been done deliberately, and that there are no context-independent closeness criteria. He predicts failure of \any humanly possible attempt at a precise de nition of comparative similarity of worlds. Not only would we go wrong by giving a precise analysis of an imprecise concept; our precise concept would not fall within { or even near { the permissible range of variation of the ordinary concept." In the case of AGM revision, G ardenfors 17, p. 11] remarks that \the postulates : : : do not uniquely characterise the revision in terms of only the database and the input. This is, however, as it should be. I believe it would be a mistake to expect that only logical properties are su cient to characterise the revision process."
Lewis and G ardenfors probably have in mind that we are not able to appropriately handle the description of the the world, and in particular the laws governing the world. Following Goodman, Lewis 28, p . 73] discusses the following solution: \whenever the laws prevailing at i are violated at a world k but not at a world j, j is closer than k to i." In other words, we should look for the closest worlds among those not violating the laws. This is a solution which has been widely used in arti cial intelligence in order to implement integrity constraints, which are nothing else than non-logical laws. 4 Lewis rejects such a solution because he thinks that laws should be defeasible. While such a position is satisfactory from the philosophical point of view, it is unsatisfactory for people in the database eld and in AI, who are looking for explicit constructions such as algorithms or procedures. Fortunately, in many computer science applications the integrity constraints can be considered to be undefeasible, and Lewis' criticism does not apply.
How can we compare update operations?
In the AI literature several concrete, unique update operations have been proposed. They have been criticized, usually by means of counterexamples, leading to alternative approaches, and so on.
The di erent approaches as well as their criticisms are based on several hypotheses, which are more or less explicitly stated in the literature:
(1) A belief base describes what is believed by an agent about the`real state of a airs' (or`the actual world'). This description consists of a set of propositional formulas. (2) The agent entertaining the belief base has sensors permitting him to acquire information about facts of the actual world. Such information consists of propositional logic formulas. (3) The agent supposes that the input information describes an event that has happened in the actual world. (4) The agent changes his beliefs in the belief base in such a way that the latter sticks as close as possible to what he believes to know about the actual world. (5) The agent does not always know whether sensing is noisy or not, and whether there is misperception or not. Now, our question is: how can we compare these operations, and how can we evaluate them w.r.t. both the KM postulates and other important requirements, such as the correct handling of integrity constraints? There are several ways to do this.
One can study the computational properties of the update operations, in particular their theoretical complexity (complexity of the decision problem). This will be done in Section 3, where we present the operations that we study. One can compare their strength. We consider that an operation 1 is stronger than 2 if for every belief base the set of possible worlds obtained by updating with 1 contains those obtained with 2 .
We shall give such an ordering of strength in Section 4. One can evaluate the competing update operations with respect to the KMpostulates.
We shall do that in Section 5. It will turn out that the majority violates most of the postulates. Based on our hypotheses, we shall argue that all violated postulates are undesirable except one. One can postulate other properties that update operations should satisfy, and then evaluate the update operations w.r.t. them.
We shall examine in Section 6 a negative requirement that has been investigated extensively in the literature, viz. that disjunctive input should not be identi ed with the exclusive disjunction. We argue that this is desirable, giving further support to the rejection of some postulates. One can study how the di erent approaches accommodate with general laws governing the world, alias integrity constraints.
This will be done in Section 7. Here the comparison is done by examples. It turns out that only two approaches can handle these examples correctly.
But rst of all we recall some more or less standard classical logic notions and notations (Section 2). In the end we shall mention some other approaches to updates (Section 8).
Preliminaries
The language is built from a possibly in nite set of atoms ATM = fp; q; r; :::g with the classical connectives^; _; :; ?; >. L; L 1 ; : : : denote literals, LIT is the set of all literals. c; c 1 ; : : : denotes clauses, i.e. disjunctions of literals. A; B; C; : : : denote formulas. We confuse belief bases (that are nite sets) with the conjunction of their elements. As far as possible we shall use B; B 1 ; : : : for belief bases, and A; A 1 ; : : : for inputs (formulas to be added).
We stipulate that : binds stronger than^and _, which bind stronger than the other connectives. We denote by atm(A) the set of atoms appearing in the formula A. For Each operation is thus de ned by associating to an interpretation and an input a set of interpretations. Basically there are two families of approaches. The rst one works by minimizing distances between worlds, while the second constrains distances to be in some set of exceptions computed from the input.
We set the following parenthesis conventions: : binds stronger than , which binds stronger than the others (although is not in the object language). We give a reformulation which is more appropriate for our purposes, and which illustrates how MCD is built on top of the PMA.
Let U be the set of models of the input A, and let w be some interpretation. Let V = w pma U be the set of models resulting from PMA-updating w with U, and let S = 2 V . For s 2 S, the 'cone' C(s) is the set of those interpretations in U that are beyond all elements of s w.r.t. the PMAcloseness ordering w :
C(s) = fu 2 U : 8v 2 s; v w ug:
The set fC (s) : s 2 Sg is a covering of U: U = fC (s) : s 2 Sg. The key idea is that PMA-minimization in that set allows to obtain more interpretations than w pma U would give us:
Example 
MCD*: iterating MCD
In 22] it has been shown that MCD fails to capture the intuitions that have been put forward in 39] (see Section 6), and an iterative version MCD* of MCD is introduced as a correction for MCD. It behaves as MCD if for every subset of the set w pma U there is only one model of the input which is minimally beyond all its elements. This means that w pma C(s) is a singleton for all s w pma U. When there are two or more, contrarily to MCD, MCD* continues to look for interpretations which are beyond, and so on.
Formally, let U be the set of models of the input A, V U = w pma U, S U = 2 V U , and C U (s) the subset of U de ned as before (i.e. C U (s) = fu 2 U : 8v 2 s; v w ug). We use here a notation di erent from the above (i.e. we index S and C by U) because inputs are not the same at each step of our inductive de nition. Then we de ne mcd* recursively as the smallest set such that:
Example 7 Let w = f:p; :q; :r; :
First w pma U = fw 1 ; w 2 g with w 1 = fp; :q; :r; :tg and w 2 = f:p; q; :r; :tg. Second, we construct C U (s) for every s 2 S U = f;; fw 1 g; fw 2 g; fw 1 ; w 2 gg. U 1 = C U (fw 1 g) = fw 1 ; : : :g, U 2 = C U (fw 2 g) = fw 2 ; : : :g, and U 3 = C U (fw 1 ; w 2 g) = fw 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 g, where w 3 = fp; q; r; :tg, w 4 = fp; q; :r; tg, and w 5 = fp; q; r; tg. Now we compute V U 1 = fw 1 g, V U 2 = fw 2 g, and V U 3 = fw 3 ; w 4 g. Again, we construct the sets U 31 This illustrates that MCD* is di erent from MCD.
We conjecture that MCD* is PSPACE-complete. (We were not able to nd a proof, which seems to be involved.)
WSS: minimal change with exceptions
Winslett's standard semantics (WSS) 38] has received only little attention until recently. It was intended to be the weakest operation deserving the name of update. It is attractive because its de nition is simple, and because it handles disjunctions correctly. w wss A is the set of those models of A which preserve the truth value of atoms not occurring in A. WSS is coNP-complete 29].
WSS#: making WSS syntax-insensitive
In fact WSS is syntax-sensitive in the input only, in the sense that the elimination of redundant input atoms changes the result of the update. Therefore it is interesting to combine WSS with preprocessing of the input to eliminate redundant atoms.
This has been proposed in 22]. Noting WSS# the resulting operation we have w wss# A = w wss A# We shall show that this is equivalent to Hegner's semantics for updates 19]. Hegner's original presentation is much more complex. He starts by eliminating redundant atoms in a di erent manner. First, he de nes the following notions: For a formula A, the set of partial models of A, denoted LB(A), ( In the original de nition: if for every u 2 LB(A), L 2 u implies that both unfLg is complete if it is minimal, and for any other minimal v 2 LB(A), u v implies that u = v. In fact the set fu 2 LB(A); u is completeg is nothing but the set of prime implicants of A. To compute P, they propose to compute Blake canonical form of A (cf. Section 2). We note in passing that this might cause exponential growth of A, and that it is preferable to use the algorithm derived from Fact 1.
for all other atoms q of A either q or :q 2 u. Let 39] , based on the same motivation as MCD. MCE has a more syntactical avour than MCD. Just as in WSS and WSS#, the basic idea is that some atoms occurring in the input should be exempted from minimization of change, i.e. they should not count when distance between interpretations is computed. Such a principle being a priori very liberal, it has two restrictions:
rst, redundant input atoms should be eliminated in a preprocessing step, avoiding thus syntax-sensitivity. Second, all those consequences of the input that are not already true in the current interpretation w should not be taken into account. Both restrictions are achieved by computing prime implicates. Example 13 Suppose w = f:p; :q; :rg, and the input A is (:p_q)^(p_r).
A covering set of prime implicates for A is D = f:p _ q; p _ r; q _ rg. It is straightforward to establish that MPMA is coNP-complete (assuming that computing P(A; w; u) is in polynomial time).
Putting things in order
What is the relation between all theses updates operations? We give some theorems and lemmas to situate each of them w.r.t. the others. The original de nition involves handling of integrity constraints. We have preferred to separate this issue, which is investigate in Section 7. 
We must prove that 9 We also discuss the plausibility of those postulates that are controversial w.r.t. our o cial reading of updates. 9 In the end of the section we give a characterization result for WSS dep in terms of a set of postulates.
(U1) B A ! A
(U1) stipulates input priority: whatever the content of B is, every update satis es the input. ((U1) has also been called the success postulate.) 9 There is a ninth postulate that is only satis ed by FORBUS and Boutilier's approach 1]. We do not discuss it here because it requires total orders, while in the sequel we shall criticise already the partial order semantical base of the KM framework. This is an uncontroversial postulate. There are criticisms arguing that input has not necessarily priority over the base. But this means that we are rather speaking about belief base fusion. Clearly such operations obey di erent postulates 26].
PROOF. Due to the structure of the update operations in order to prove that FORBUS, PMA, MCD, MCD*, MCE satisfy (U2.2), it is su cient to prove that MCD* and MCE satisfy (U2.2). Discussion. So it is (U2.2) that is controversial, while (U2.1) is not. We agree with the viewpoints of 2,1,10,9] and others, who have argued that (U2) should be abandoned. Consider the example in the proof of Theorem 29 discriminating violation of (U2.2). If we take seriously our hypotheses of Section 1.3 then p (p _ q) cannot be equivalent to p. Indeed, suppose an agent believes p. Suppose lateron he gets sensor information expressed by the formula p_q. Given that time has passed, maintaining belief in p means that the agent prefers to consider that sensing got noisy in an otherwise unchanged world, instead of correct sensing in an evolving world. But it is at least unjusti ed to always make such a hypothesis.
Let v 2 (B^A) MCD
To witness, suppose with 2] that p means that a certain coin shows heads, and q that it shows tails, and that the agent perceives that another agent grasps the coin and tosses it (but without perceiving the outcome). Then clearly p (p _ q) should be p _ q, and not p. Although it is claimed in 39] that MCD and MCE satisfy (U5), this is not the case. Indeed, the following example shows that MCD violates (U5 0 Discussion. We start with an innocent-looking consequence of (U5). The condition of (Exor) expresses that A 1 and A 2 are in some sense independent of each other. 12 The link between (U5) and the property (Exor) of the lemma had not been noticed before 22] , and e.g. 39] claim that MCD satis es (U1) and (U5) while avoiding an exclusive interpretation of the inclusive or.
always leads to the exclusive disjunction. But why should new information about an event such that A 1 _ A 2 make us exclude that A 1^A2 ? There seems to be no reason for that. This is illustrated by an adaptation of Reiter's example against the PMA (which is an instance of example 36).
Example 39 Suppose you throw a coin on a chessboard. Suppose Black means \the coin falls on a black eld", and White \the coin falls on a white eld". The coin might fall either on a black eld, or on a white eld, or on both of them. Initially we hold the coin, i.e. B is :Black^:White. If we observe that the coin falls on a white eld we should keep on believing that :Black, and vice versa. This means that B Black ! :White, and B White ! :Black. Now suppose that (due to our distance to the chessboard or the observation angle) we can only see that the coin fell down, without perceiving its position. This corresponds to an update with Black _ White. (Exor) tells us that we should have B (Black _ White) ! Black White, i.e. the coin cannot touch a black and a white eld at the same time. This is clearly unintuitive.
As (U1) is uncontroversial, (U5) is the culprit and must be declared undesirable.
Remark 40 Circumscription and other minimization-based approaches behave in the same way 12]. We note that this does not mean that (U5) and the exclusive interpretation of disjunctions must be abandoned in the context of belief base revision and also nonmonotonic reasoning. This means that if A 1 and A 2 are`equivalent under B' then they lead to the same update. (U5) we obtain (B A 2 )^A 1 ! B (A 1^A2 ). Hence B A 2 ! B (A 1^A2 ). Thus (B A 2 ) ! B A 1 . By symmetry we obtain B A 1 ! B A 2 .
In the other sense, by (U1) we have B ( In 40] only a weaker variant of (U6) is proved to hold for MCE.
;. where EXC (A 1 ) represents the set of exceptions w.r.t. w Discussion. We claim that (U7) is almost meaningless: to consider complete belief bases does not 'give' us very much, because even for nite languages belief bases are in general incomplete, in the sense that they do not completely describe the actual world, but rather several possible ones. It has been shown that the above characterization can be turned in a decision procedure 22]. 6 The problem of disjunctive input
In the preceding section we have already pointed out that (U5) is closely related to an undesirable exclusive interpretation of the inclusive disjunction.
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As the PMA and FORBUS satisfy all the KM-postulates they are immediately subject to our criticism. This can be illustrated by Example 39.
The other approaches have all been designed in a way such that (Exor) is avoided. In the rest of the section we show that failure of (U5) and (Exor) is not enough to guarantee correct handling of disjunctive input, and that MCD, 17 There is a characterization of the PMA in 14], but only in terms of conditional logic. 18 We have corrected an error in 22]: the equivalence in (NI1) is an implication there.
MCD* and MCE fail to capture the intuitions that have been put forward. The arguments are in terms of toy examples. WSS and its relatives WSS#, WSS# dep and MPMA give the intuitive result at least for these examples. The interpretation fp; q; r; sg is not a model of the updated belief base. Hence the coin cannot touch a black and a white eld at the same time, which is clearly counterintuitive. Thus the MCD interprets the nested inclusive disjunction r _ s by the exclusive one r s.
This example motivated the introduction of MCD* in 22].
A counterexample against MCD* and MCE
Suppose we have to move a box around in a warehouse with two oors. Suppose that p means \the box is in the bottom of the warehouse", q means \the box is in the second oor", and r means \the box is on the right side". Suppose initially the box is on the left side of the front region, on the rst oor, i.e. the belief base is f:p; :q; :rg. Now suppose we ask a robot to put the box somewhere else in the warehouse, but not in the bottom of the rst oor. This means that the box should be moved either on the second oor or in the front of the right rst oor side, i.e. the input is (:p^r)_q. Then we would expect the result (:p^r) _ q. Example 25 shows that w.r.t. MCE it is prohibited that robot puts the box in the bottom of the second oor, while he could put it on the right side of the second oor! In the two cases the robot will make the same 'steps' in the sense of area change. Why one is preferred over the other? In the case of the PMA and FORBUS, the robot would go right or go up. This corresponds to the fact that in these approaches the 'steps' the robot makes are minimized. MCD and MCD* behave as MCE. 7 The problem of handling integrity constraints Integrity constraints are formulas that have a particular status: they must be guaranteed to hold after every update. Update operations should take into account such constraints.
We view integrity constraints as a nite set of formulas IC which can be confused with the conjunction of its elements, just as in the case of belief bases. Formally, what we are interested in are update operations IC In this section we concentrate on approaches that have been designed to correctly handle such constraints, viz. WSS dep and MPMA . Both of them resort to causal notions. Indeed, one story to learn from Lifschitz' counterexample above is that there are aspects of the domain structure which cannot be expressed by classical integrity constraints. In 30], Lifschitz proposes to distinguish between frame and non-frame atoms. We can recast his solution in terms of a boolean dependence function. E.g. the atom Light is dependent, and this means that it is a secondary atom whose value is de ned by primary atoms such as Up 1 and Up 2 .
Thielscher 35] has given a counterexample showing that such a categorization is too simple. Basically, his argument is that in particular circumstances, every atom can be forced to be dependent. It remains to illustrate the di erences between WSS# dep , and MPMA : rst, the dependence function is a sort of weak causal connection, while in MPMA the causal connection is a strong one. Dependence is a function which maps an atom to a set of atoms, while in MPMA the causal connection is between formulas. We can also remark that the causal connection in MPMA is transitive in the sense that the causal rules fA B; B Cg and fA B; B C; A Cg lead to the same update operation. This is not the case in WSS# dep , due to the weak character of the causal connection.
All these di erences make a formal comparison di cult.
Other approaches
The approaches presented in this section are not in the tradition of those presented in section 3. We discuss them now in order to complete the picture 20 The original de nition in 9] is slightly di erent but equivalent.
and conclude that our criticisms of the KM-postulates also apply to them.
The rst approach is that of Boutilier in 1] in the framework of propositional knowledge base update. The basic idea of his work is to combine revision and update, providing a more realistic characterization of belief change. An incoming information about a change in the world can lead an agent to revise his prior beliefs before updating it. Boutilier presents a general model for update taking into account such considerations. The framework is based on the notions of ranking, event and transition.
What we are interested in is the relationship between his model and that of KM. In fact, his operator satis es in the general case (U1), (U4), (U6), (U7) and (U9 ). This is due to his hypothesis that the input do not correspond necessarily to event. But this contradicts our hypotheses of section 1.3.
The same criticisms apply to Del Val and Shoham in 7] . They propose a theory of update using the situation calculus in which frame and rami cation problems can be solved in a systematic way by default persistence of facts. They provide a relation between their approach and the KM-postulates, and prove that their construction satis es (U1), (U3), (U5), (U6) and (U8). The undesirability of their operator is enforced by the presence of (U5) and (U6).
Another framework far from the ones we have described was proposed by Reiter in 33], using the situation calculus and theories of actions to perform update.
Summary and conclusion
Here we collect the main results of the paper.
(1) We have given an exhaustive analysis of the comparative strength of update operators that have been proposed in the literature (Section 4). The graph of Figure 1 illustrates that, where the upper operations are the stronger ones. lates. We have argued that (U4) is desirable, while (U2), (U5), and (U6) are not, and that (U7) is without importance. We have also shown how (U4) can be enforced in a simple way. In the KM framework, (U5) and (U6) are crucial if we want to give semantics to update operations in terms of partial preorders on interpretations. Given our critical examination of these postulates, this means the other way round that we cannot resort to such devices any longer when we look for semantics of update operations. (4) We have thoroughly investigated updates with disjunctive input. We have shown in Section 5 that it is (U5) which unintuitively makes inclusive disjunctions behave just as exclusive ones. We have gone beyond that in Section 6 and have shown by counterexamples that the operations MCD, MCD*, and MCE, while not satisfying (U5) still have that unintuitive feature, and therefore fail to do the job they were designed for. Hence only WSS#, WSS# dep , MPMA, and MPMA correctly handle disjunctive input. (5) We have characterized one of the approaches WSS# dep by a complete set of postulates. Table 1 Satisfaction of the KM-postulates (Section 5) (U1) (U2) (U3) (U4) (U5) (U6) (U7) (U8) Let us add here that a realistic set of update postulates should take into account integrity constraints. This can be done in a straightforward way by adding a further postulate (U0 IC ) and adapting those postulates appealing to consistence.
Putting together our results on the plausibility of the KM postulates and our remark on integrity constraints we obtain our o cial set of postulates. It is di cult to give the form of postulates to the other requirement that we advocate, viz. that inclusive input should not be interpreted exclusively.
Among the ten update operations that we have presented, only WSS# dep and MPMA have shown to ful l the requirements and resist to all the counterex-amples. The simplicity of WSS# dep and the fact that it is coNP-complete make us think that it is the most promising approach for further investigations.
Finally, it remains to notice that the laws we consider are static in the sense that they rule only one state of a airs. We agree with Reiter 33] that dynamic laws which rule at least two states of a airs are an important issue. We have proposed in previous work to handle such constraints by using a conditional operator 13]. Recent results on the interaction between updates and conditionals support such an approach 4, 34, 21] . But this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
